Political tax cycles in the US states: Opportunism versus ideological sincerity in governors' revenue proposals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Douglas, James W.; Szmer, John; Raudla, Ringa
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Charlotte; Tallinn University of Technology
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12886
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: budget cycles; business cycles; fiscal-policy; electoral accountability; Gubernatorial elections; Macroeconomic policy; legislatures; GOVERNMENT; taxation; ECONOMY

摘要

Do politicians behave opportunistically regarding their tax proposals during the election cycle, or do they maintain ideological sincerity? We examine U.S. governors' revenue proposals between the years of 1989 and 2018 to assess gubernatorial behavior during election years. We find that governors, in general, do indeed follow a political budget cycle where they request lower revenues during election years. However, this finding is largely driven by Democratic governors asking for significantly lower revenues during election years when compared to non-election years. Republican governors are more ideologically sincere, maintaining behaviors that are consistent across the election cycle.