Calibrating autonomy: How bureaucratic autonomy influences government quality in Brazil

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bersch, Katherine; Fukuyama, Francis
• 署名单位: Davidson College; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12865
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: state; governance; performance; management; CORRUPTION; DISCRETION; capacity

摘要

The interactions between bureaucratic agencies and political actors shape governance outcomes, yet scholars disagree about how bureaucratic autonomy relates to government quality. Some claim that enhancing autonomy improves quality, whereas others maintain the opposite. An influential article by Fukuyama (2013) in Governance suggests a curvilinear relationship, moderated by capacity. This article evaluates the theory empirically, focusing on within-country variation and two dimensions of autonomy: independence and discretion. Drawing on an original survey of over 3200 public sector workers in Brazil and administrative data on 325,000 public servants, we find evidence suggesting that the relationship between perceived autonomy and quality depends on the type of perceived autonomy and level of capacity. Public servants' perceptions of independence from political actors are associated with increased perceptions about governance quality in a linear fashion. For perceived discretion, we find initial evidence of a Goldilocks relationship: too little reduces perceptions of government quality but so does too much, especially in low-capacity areas. Our findings offer initial evidence that may qualify claims that limiting bureaucratic discretion while increasing political oversight improves governance; instead, context may be crucial.