The Effect of Performance Reporting Frequency on Employee Performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hecht, Gary; Hobson, Jessen L.; Wang, Laura W.
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/accr-52601
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 199-218
• 关键词: feedback frequency; ACHIEVEMENT GOALS; information asymmetry; HIERARCHICAL MODEL; PAY SCHEME; SLACK; Mediation; motivation; Managers; horizon

摘要

Conventional wisdom suggests that frequent performance reporting is beneficial for decision making, as it can enhance timeliness and usefulness of the reported information for decision making. We investigate a potential motivational cost of frequent performance reporting. Using goal orientation theory, we predict and find that frequent performance reporting has negative motivational and performance implications when employees know or assume that the information they report will be used to evaluate their task-related skill. Our theory and results suggest that organizations need to balance the informational benefits and motivational costs of frequent reporting when designing their performance reporting systems. In addition, our theory and results can help organizations begin to design solutions that take advantage of the informational advantage of frequent reporting while minimizing its motivational costs.