Information Externalities and Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from a Major Customer's Earnings Announcement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cho, Young Jun; Kim, Yongtae; Zang, Yoonseok
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University; Santa Clara University; Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST)
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/tar-2017-0129
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 73-96
• 关键词: supplier relationships; vertical integration; CORPORATE DISCLOSURE; capital-markets; management; cost; forecasts; determinants; performance; association

摘要

We examine the relation between information externalities along the supply chain and voluntary disclosure. Information transfers from a major customer's earnings announcement (EA) can substitute for its supplier's disclosure. Conversely, if the customer's EA increases uncertainties regarding the supplier's future prospects, it can increase the demand for disclosure. After controlling for information incorporated in supplier returns, we find that the supplier is more likely to issue earnings guidance after the customer's EA when the EA news deviates more from the market's expectation. The positive effect of the customer's news on earnings guidance is weaker when common investors, supply-chain analysts, or a common industry allow investors to better understand the value implications of the news, while the effect increases with the importance of the customer to the supplier. The effect is also stronger when EA news is negative rather than positive. Collectively, the results suggest that supply-chain relationships influence voluntary disclosure.