Does Status Equal Substance? The Effects of Specialist Social Status on Auditor Assessments of Complex Estimates

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gold, Anna; Kadous, Kathryn; Leiby, Justin
• 署名单位: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Emory University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/TAR-2021-0298
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 197-222
• 关键词: performance expectations; affirmative-action; expertise; GENDER; work; Justification; CONSTRUCTION; credibility; management; EVOLUTION

摘要

Auditing standards require that auditors' reliance on a specialist is commensurate with the specialist's competence. In assessing competence, auditors encounter cues diagnostic of the specialist's social status but less so of competence. In an experiment, we manipulate specialist status and find that auditors mistake status for competence unless they are prompted to separate the constructs. This raises the possibility that auditors could over- rely on high-status specialists. However, auditors also assess high-status specialists as more influential, and when the specialist disagrees with the client, they rely more on high-status specialists because of this perceived influence. Thus, high-status specialists can increase auditors' willingness to challenge the client by providing a strong ally. Additional analyses suggest that auditors are aware that they rely on the specialist's influence rather than competence, indicating that auditors do not use the process that auditing standards envision to evaluate and rely on specialists.