Whistleblowers and Outcomes of Financial Misrepresentation Enforcement Actions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Call, Andrew C.; Martin, Gerald S.; Sharp, Nathan Y.; Wilde, Jaron H.
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; American University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Iowa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12177
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 123-171
• 关键词: earnings management; CONSEQUENCES; IMPACT; FRAUD; TRADE

摘要

Whistleblowers are ostensibly a valuable resource to regulators investigating securities violations, but whether there is a link between whistleblower involvement and the outcomes of enforcement actions is unclear. Using a data set of employee whistleblowing allegations obtained from the U.S. government and the universe of enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation, we find that whistleblower involvement is associated with higher monetary penalties for targeted firms and employees and with longer prison sentences for culpable executives. We also find that regulators more quickly begin enforcement proceedings when whistleblowers are involved. Our findings suggest that whistleblowers are a valuable source of information for regulators who investigate and prosecute financial misrepresentation.