The influence of large clients on office-level auditor oversight: Evidence from the property-casualty insurance industry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gaver, Jennifer J.; Paterson, Jeffrey S.
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.02.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 关键词: management; earnings

摘要

We analyze the loss-reserving practices of 562 insurance companies in 1993 to assess the relation between client influence and auditor oversight. Consistent with Petroni [1992. Management's response to the differential costs and benefits of optimistic reporting in the property-casualty insurance industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics 15, 485-508.], we find that financially struggling insurers tend to under-reserve. However, this behavior is attenuated when the weak insurer is important to the local practice office of the auditor. This result holds across various measures of client influence and supports the contention of Reynolds and Francis [2001. Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting divisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30, 375-400.] that auditors allow less accounting discretion to their larger clients. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.