A Note on Optimal Selling to Asymmetric Retailers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kostamis, Dimitris
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.1111/poms.12008
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1118-1125
• 关键词: Supply chain; competing retailers; channel coordination; DISTRIBUTION-SYSTEM; vertical control; opportunism; nondiscrimination; exclusivity; UNIFORMITY; CONTRACTS

摘要

I consider a channel with one manufacturer selling the same product to two retailers engaged in imperfect competition. The retailers are asymmetric because one has a lower marginal selling cost (or a higher demand potential) than the other. I design the manufacturer's optimal selling mechanism, whereby the manufacturer must offer the same contract options to both retailers. I fully characterize the manufacturer's optimal selling mechanism for varying degrees of retailer asymmetry and competition intensity. I find that under certain conditions, the manufacturer is better off selling a larger quantity through the high-cost (or low-demand potential) retailer. I also show how the optimal mechanism can be implemented using a menu of two-part tariffs with quantity controls.