Delay in Trade Networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Thanh Nguyen; Subramanian, Vijay; Berry, Randall
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0030-364X
• DOI: 10.1287/opre.2016.1490
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 646-661
• 关键词: bargaining model; middlemen; equilibrium; uncertainty; INFORMATION; MARKETS

摘要

We study decentralized markets involving producers and consumers that are facilitated by middlemen. We do this by analyzing a noncooperative networked bargaining game. We assume a complete information setup wherein all the agents know the structure of the network, the values of the consumers, and the transaction costs involved but allow for some search friction when either producers or consumers trade with middlemen. In such a setting, we show that sunk cost problems and a heterogeneous network can give rise to delay or failure in negotiation, and therefore reduce the total trade capacity of the network. In the limiting regime of extremely patient agents, we provide a sharp characterization of the trade pattern and the segmentation of these markets.