Incomplete Information, Debt Issuance, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Benzoni, Luca; Garlappi, Lorenzo; Goldstein, Robert
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; University of British Columbia; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4529
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 4331-4352
• 关键词: bond pricing; credit spreads; jumps to default

摘要

We derive a firm's debt issuance policy when managers have an informational advantage over creditors and face debt restructuring costs. In our model, regardless of how poor their private signal is, managers of firms that can access the credit market avoid default by issuing new debt to service existing debt. Therefore, only bonds of firms that have exhausted their ability to borrow are subject to jump-to-default risk because of incomplete information and, in turn, command a jump-to-default risk premium. We document that our model captures many salient features of the corporate bond market.