Paying for Performance in Public Pension Plans

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lu, Yan; Mullally, Kevin; Ray, Sugata
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4554
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 4888-4907
• 关键词: public pension fund performance; COMPENSATION; incentives

摘要

We examine the relation between public pension plan chief investment officer (CIO) compensation and plans' investment performance. Higher paid CIOs outperform their counterparts by 47-60 basis points per year, largely through increased and superior investment in private equity and real estate. This outperformance generates an additional $74.91-$95.63 million in economic value. Plans offering higher compensation hire better educated CIOs and are more likely to retain their CIOs. Higher CIO compensation is positively correlated with the use of incentive compensation, but incentive compensation does not directly affect performance. Demand- and supply-side frictions help explain the variation in CIO pay and the persistent low compensation paid by some plans despite the positive relation between compensation and performance.