De-Crypto-ing Signals in Initial Coin Offerings: Evidence of Rational Token Retention

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Davydiuk, Tetiana; Gupta, Deeksha; Rosen, Samuel
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University; Johns Hopkins University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4631
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 6584-6624
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; signaling; entrepreneurial financing; ICOs

摘要

Using the market for initial coin offerings (ICOs) as a laboratory, we provide evidence that entrepreneurs use retention to alleviate information asymmetry. The underlying technology and the absence of regulation make the ICO market well suited to study this question empirically. Using a hand-collected data set, we show that ICO issuers that retain a larger fraction of their tokens are more successful in their funding efforts and are more likely to develop a working product. Moreover, we find that retention is a stronger signal when markets are crowded, and investors do not have as much time to conduct due diligence.