Dynamic Pricing with Uncertain Capacities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garcia, Daniel; Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Shopova, Radostina
• 署名单位: University of Vienna; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4613
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 5275-5297
• 关键词: Dynamic pricing; capacity constraints; private information; disclosure; industrial espionage

摘要

In markets, such as those for airline tickets and hotel accommodations, firms sell time-dated products and have private information about unsold capacities. We show that competition under private information may explain observed phenomena, such as increased price dispersion and higher expected prices toward the deadline. We also show that private information severely limits the market power of firms and that information exchange about capacity increases firms' profits. Finally, we inquire into the incentives to unilaterally disclose information or to engage in espionage about rival's capacity and show that they increase firms' profits compared with the private information setting.