Disclosure in Incentivized Reviews: Does It Protect Consumers?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Park, Sungsik; Shin, Woochoel; Xie, Jinhong
• 署名单位: University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.00930
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 7009-7021
• 关键词: Information disclosure; Consumer protection; online reviews; incentivized reviews; user-generated information; incentive compatibility; sponsorship disclosure

摘要

The well-documented rating inflation of incentivized reviews (IRs) can mislead consumers into choosing a product that they would otherwise not buy. To protect consumers from this undesirable influence, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission recommends that reviewers conspicuously disclose any material connection they may have with sellers. In theory, such disclosures safeguard consumers by motivating reviewers to be truthful and inducing consumers to discount inflated IR ratings. Our research finds, however, that IR disclosure accomplishes neither. Specifically, our empirical analysis of consumer reviews on Amazon reveals that, even with disclosure, (1) rating inflation of IRs remains, and (2) this inflation boosts sales at consumers' expense. Finally, we propose an alternative approach to eliminate rating inflation of IRs and empirically demonstrate its effectiveness. These findings have important implications for consumers, firms, and ongoing policy discussions around IRs.