Non-Bayesian Statistical Discrimination

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Campos-Mercade, Pol; Mengel, Friederike
• 署名单位: Lund University; University of Essex; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.4824
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: statistical discrimination; conservatism; naive employers; experiments

摘要

Models of statistical discrimination typically assume that employers make rational inference from (education) signals. However, there is a large amount of evidence showing that most people do not update their beliefs rationally. We use a model and two experiments to show that employers who are conservative, in the sense of signal neglect, discriminate more against disadvantaged groups than Bayesian employers. We find that such non-Bayesian statistical discrimination deters high-ability workers from disadvantaged groups from pursuing education, further exacerbating initial group inequalities. Excess discrimination caused by employer conservatism is especially important when signals are very informative. Out of the overall hiring gap in our data, around 40% can be attributed to Bayesian statistical discrimination, a further 40% is due to non-Bayesian statistical discrimination, and the remaining 20% is unexplained or potentially taste-based.