Report-Dependent Utility and Strategy-Proofness

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Meisner, Vincent
• 署名单位: Technical University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4504
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 2733-2745
• 关键词: Market design; matching; school choice; self-regarding preferences; Strategy-proof mechanisms

摘要

Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof mecha-nisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declare desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position in the submitted ranking such that a strategic trade-off between preference intensity and match probability arises. This trade-off can trigger the commonly observed self-selection strategies. We show that misrepresentations can persist for arbitrarily small report-dependent components. However, honesty is guaranteed to be optimal if and only if there is no conflict between the quality and feasibility of a match. We substantiate the theory with already existing evidence and provide novel testable predictions.