StableFees: A Predictable Fee Market for Cryptocurrencies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Basu, Soumya; Easley, David; O'Hara, Maureen; Sirer, Emin Gun
• 署名单位: Cornell University; Cornell University; Cornell University; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.4735
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 6508-6524
• 关键词: Cryptocurrency; Blockchain; Transaction fees

摘要

Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies must solve the problem of assigning priorities to competing transactions. The most widely used mechanism involves each transaction offering a fee to be paid once the transaction is processed, but this discriminatory price mechanism fails to yield stable equilibria with predictable prices. We propose an alternate fee setting mechanism, StableFees, that is based on uniform price auctions. We prove that our proposed protocol is free from manipulation by users and miners as the number of users and miners increases and show empirically that gains from manipulation are small in practice. We show that StableFees reduces the fees paid by users and reduces the variance of fee income to miners. Data from December 2017 show that, if implemented, StableFees could have saved Bitcoin users $272,528,000 USD in transaction fees while reducing the variance of miner's fee income, on average, by a factor of 7.4. We argue that our fee protocol also has important social welfare and environmental benefits.