Can Blockchain Technology Help Overcome Contractual Incompleteness? Evidence from State Laws

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Mark A.; Hu, Shuting Sophia; Wang, Joanna; Wu, Qinxi
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Baylor University; Peking University; Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen)
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.04139
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 6540-6567
• 关键词: blockchain; Smart contracts; incomplete contracts; holdup problem; corporate policy

摘要

Real-world contractual agreements between firms are often incomplete, leading to suboptimal investment and loss of value in supply chain relationships. To what extent can blockchain technology help alleviate problems arising from contractual incompleteness? We examine this issue by exploiting a quasi-natural experiment based on the staggered adoption of U.S. state laws that increased firms' in-state ability to develop, adopt, and use blockchain technology. We find that, after exposure to a pro-blockchain law, firms with greater asset specificity exhibit more positive changes to Tobin's Q, research and development, and blockchain-related innovation. Also, such firms appear to rely less on vertical integration, form more strategic alliances, and shift their emphasis to less geographically proximate customers. Overall, our results suggest that blockchain technology can help firms remedy constraints and inefficiencies arising from contractual incompleteness.