Shareholder Short-Termism, Corporate Control and Voluntary Disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jia, Xue; Menon, Rahul
• 署名单位: University of Melbourne; Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4357
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 702-721
• 关键词: active shareholder; shareholder short-termism; intervention; voluntary disclosure; Managerial myopia

摘要

This paper examines how a manager uses voluntary disclosure to influence corporate control by a short-term shareholder. Because a short-term shareholder intervenes excessively, the manager's disclosure strategy is determined by the trade-off between excessive and insufficient intervention. In equilibrium, when shareholder short-termism is not too high, the manager discloses both good and bad news and withholds intermediate news. Alternatively, when shareholder short-termism is high, the manager only discloses good news and withholds bad news. In both equilibria, withholding information is value-enhancing for the nondisclosing firms. We also show that the likelihood of disclosure weakly decreases as the shareholder is more short-term-oriented. Moreover, nondisclosing firms are more likely to face shareholder intervention than disclosing firms.