Anticorruption, Government Subsidies, and Innovation: Evidence from China

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fang, Lily; Lerner, Josh; Wu, Chaopeng; Zhang, Qi
• 署名单位: INSEAD Business School; Harvard University; Harvard University; Xiamen University; Shandong University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4611
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 4363-4388
• 关键词: Research and development; INNOVATION; GOVERNMENT; subsidies; anti-corruption

摘要

We leverage an exogenous shock-the crackdown on corrupt Chinese officials beginning in 2012-and examine how the allocation of research subsidies and innovative outcomes were affected. We argue that the staggered removal of provincial heads on corruption charges during China's anticorruption campaign and the unanticipated departures of local government officials responsible for innovation programs led to plausibly exogenous reductions in corruption. After both events, the allocation of subsidies became more sensitive to firm merit than to corruption and subsidies became more strongly associated with future innovation. Anticorruption efforts and officials' career incentives improved the efficacy of subsidy programs.