Sunk Cost Bias and Time Inconsistency: A Strategic Analysis of Pricing Decisions

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Jain, Sanjay; Chen, Haipeng (Allan)
署名单位:
University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Kentucky
刊物名称:
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
ISSN/ISSBN:
0025-1909
DOI:
10.1287/mnsc.2022.4479
发表日期:
2023
页码:
2383-2400
关键词:
sunk cost bias Time-inconsistent preferences behavioral economics game theory pricing
摘要:
It is generally acknowledged that sunk cost bias leads to suboptimal decisions, such as escalation of commitment. Some researchers, however, suggest that sunk cost bias can be beneficial when consumers have self-control problems. In this paper we explore the case when consumers with sunk cost bias have time-inconsistent preferences and, therefore, suffer from self-control problems. We experimentally demonstrate that sunk costs can make subjects better off by inducing higher effort. We then develop an analytical model to explore the implications of sunk cost bias for firm's pricing strategy. We find that, in the presence of sunk cost bias, higher prices can lead to higher experienced quality. We show that sunk cost bias can sometimes improve firm's profits, lead to lower prices, and increase welfare. Our results suggest that, when consumers use a product for multiple periods, pricing policies such as 0% financing, which are often viewed as exploitative, can instead lead to lower total prices, higher profits, and higher welfare.