Marketplace Scalability and Strategic Use of Platform Investment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Jin; Pisano, Gary; Xu, Yejia; Zhu, Feng
• 署名单位: University of Hong Kong; Harvard University; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4522
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 3958-3975
• 关键词: marketplace; scalability; platform strategy; platform investment

摘要

The scalability of a marketplace depends on the operations of the marketplace platform and its sellers' capacities. In this study, we explore one strategy that a marketplace platform can use to enhance its scalability: providing an ancillary service to sellers. In our model, a platform can choose whether and when to provide this service to sellers and, if so, what prices to charge and which types of sellers to serve. Although such a service helps small sellers, we highlight that the provision of such a service can diminish the incentives of large sellers to make their own investment, thereby reducing their potential output. When the output reduction by large sellers is substantial, the platform may not want to provide the ancillary service, and, even if it does, it may choose to set a price higher than its marginal cost to motivate large sellers to scale. The platform may also choose to strategically delay the provision of the service.