Decentralized Platforms: Governance, Tokenomics, and ICO Design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gan, Jingxing (Rowena); Tsoukalas, Gerry; Netessine, Serguei
• 署名单位: Southern Methodist University; Boston University; International Institute for Management Development (IMD); University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.02076
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 6667-6683
• 关键词: blockchain platforms; decentralized governance; initial coin offerings; moral hazard; tokenomics; two-sided platforms

摘要

Traditional two-sided platforms (e.g., Amazon, Uber) rely primarily on commission contracts to generate revenues and fuel growth, whereas their decentralized counterparts (e.g., Uniswap, Filecoin) often forego these in favor of token retention. What economics underpin this choice? We show that with properly designed initial coin offerings (ICOs), both mechanisms can independently alleviate market failures at the initial fundraising stage and incentivize long-term platform building. However, they achieve this in different ways. Although commission contracts often lead to higher profits for founders, token retention leads to higher service levels, benefiting the users and service providers. In essence, token retention surrenders a fraction of earnings to better align with the tenets of decentralized governance. Combining both mechanisms can add value, but only in relatively limited cases. These findings offer guidance and a possible rationale for why platforms may want to favor one mechanism over the other or use both.