Talking About Performance or Paying for It? A Field Experiment on Performance Reviews and Incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Manthei, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk; Vogelsang, Timo
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; Frankfurt School Finance & Management
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4431
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 2198-2216
• 关键词: performance pay; monitoring; feedback; field experiment; Management practices

摘要

We investigate the causal effect of performance pay and conversations about performance in 224 stores of a retail chain implementing a field experiment with a 2x2 factorial design. In the performance pay treatments, managers receive a bonus, which is a simple linear function of the profits achieved above a threshold value. In the performance review treatments, managers have to report their activities undertaken to increase profits in regular meetings. We find that whereas performance pay did not yield significant profit increases, performance review conversations increased profits by about 7%. However, when additionally receiving performance pay, the positive effect of performance reviews vanished. We provide evidence from surveys and meeting protocols that performance pay changes the nature of conversations, leading to a stronger self-reliance of store managers, which undermines the value of the performance reviews.