On the Disclosure of Half-Truths and the Duty to Update

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Beyer, Anne; Dye, Ronald A.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4519
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 4283-4311
• 关键词: half-truths; duty to update; voluntary disclosures; Stock prices

摘要

We develop a model of a manager's equilibrium voluntary disclosure policy to study how that policy changes depending on whether the manager is prohibited from disclosing, or allowed to disclose, a half-truth; we also examine how the disclosure policy changes depending on whether the manager has a duty to update past disclosures. Among our results, we show that if a manager is prohibited from issuing half-truths, the manager discloses a wider array of information than if the manager is allowed to issue half-truths, and investors view the absence of disclosure more skeptically; we also show that imposing a duty to update on the manager does not affect the manager's initial disclosures, but it results in the manager disclosing uniformly more information over time.