Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the US Supplemental Security Income Program

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhang, Yiwei; Hemmeter, Jeffrey; Kessler, Judd B.; Metcalfe, Robert D.; Weathersf, Robert
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4645
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1341-1353
• 关键词: Nudges; field experiment; public policy; wage reporting; disability and work

摘要

We study a large-scale (n = 50,000) natural field experiment implemented by the U.S. Social Security Administration aimed at increasing the timely and accurate self-reporting of wages by Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients. A letter reminding SSI recipients of their wage reporting responsibilities significantly increased both the likelihood of reporting any earnings and the total earnings reported. However, the specific letter content-providing social information or highlighting the salience of penalties had no systematic effect. We develop a conservative estimate that the letters generated roughly $5.91 in savings per dollar spent, highlighting the value of such a nudge in this important context.