Corporate Political Connections and Favorable Environmental Regulatory Enforcement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heitz, Amanda; Wang, Youan; Wang, Zigan
• 署名单位: Tulane University; University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3931
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 7838-7859
• 关键词: political connections; ELECTIONS; regulation

摘要

We examine whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uniformly enforces the Clean Air Act for politically connected and unconnected firms using a close election setting. We find no difference in regulated pollutant emissions or EPA investigations between the two groups, although connected firms experience less regulatory enforcement and lower penalties. These results are more pronounced for firms connected to politicians capable of influencing regulatory bureaucrats and for connected firms that are more important to their supported politicians. Taken together, our results show that campaign contributions can indirectly benefit firms by way of reduced environmental regulatory enforcement and penalties.