How to De-Reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aygun, Orhan; Turhan, Bertan
• 署名单位: Bogazici University; Iowa State University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4566
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 6147-6164
• 关键词: Market design; matching; reserve systems; de-reservation; affirmative action; INDIA

摘要

We study the joint implementation of reservation and de-reservation policies in India that has been enforcing comprehensive affirmative action since 1950. The landmark judgment of the Supreme Court of India in 2008 mandated that whenever the OBC category (with 27% reservation) has unfilled positions, they must be reverted to general category applicants in admissions to public schools without specifying how to implement it. We disclose the drawbacks of the recently reformed allocation procedure in admissions to technical colleges and offer a solution through de-reservation via choice rules. We propose a novel priority design-Backward Transfers (BT) choice rule-for institutions and the deferred acceptance mechanism under these choice rules (DA-BT) for centralized clearinghouses. We show that DA-BT corrects the shortcomings of existing mechanisms. By formulating India's legal requirements and policy goals as formal axioms, we show that the DA-BT mechanism is unique for the concurrent implementation of reservation and de-reservation policies.