COALITION-FORMATION IN STANDARD-SETTING ALLIANCES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: AXELROD, R; MITCHELL, W; THOMAS, RE; BENNETT, DS; BRUDERER, E
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.41.9.1493
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 1493-1508
• 关键词: standardization; alliance; computer industry; UNIX

摘要

We present a theory for predicting how business firms form alliances to develop and sponsor technical standards. Our basic assumptions are that the utility of a firm for joining a particular standard-setting alliance increases with the size of the alliance and decreases with the presence of rivals in the alliance, especially close rivals. The predicted alliance configurations are simply the Nash equilibria, i.e., those sets of alliances for which no single firm has an incentive to switch to another alliance. We illustrate our theory by estimating the choices of nine computer companies to join one of two alliances sponsoring competing Unix operating system standards in 1988.