Managing capacity through reward programs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kim, BD; Shi, MZ; Srinivasan, K
• 署名单位: Seoul National University (SNU); University of Toronto; Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1030.0175
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 503-520
• 关键词: capacity management; COMPETITION; pricing under capacity constraints; reward programs

摘要

Rewarding customers with own products or services has become an increasingly popular practice across a spectrum of industries such as airlines, hotels, and telecommunication. In these service industries, firms face demand uncertainty and strict short-term capacity constraint. When the market demand is low, firms hold excess capacities that would lead to intense price competition. In this paper we study the adoption and design of reward programs in the context of capacity management. We demonstrate that it is optimal for firms to offer capacity rewards when the market demand varies from one period to the other. By offering the reward programs, firms can effectively reduce available capacities when the market demand is low, and hence credibly show their unwillingness to undersell. Such a commitment can encourage their competitors to set their prices high. When firms provide reward programs, if a firm sets a higher price than the other and sells less today, in the future the firm can benefit from the other firm's larger reduction in available capacity through rewards. Thus, reward programs also provide additional incentives for firms to set higher current prices. Finally, since reward programs can add flexibility in adjusting the available capacities to the market demand, firms increase the size of regular capacities with reward programs.