Agent competition double-auction mechanism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chu, Leon Yang; Shen, Zuo-Jun Max
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0528
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1215-1222
• 关键词: Mechanism design; Double auction; strategyproof mechanism

摘要

This paper proposes an agent competition double-auction mechanism to simplify decision making and promote transactions for the customer-to-customer marketplaces. Under the proposed double-auction mechanism, bidding one's true valuation (private information) is the best strategy for each individual buyer and seller even when shipping costs and sales taxes are different across various possible transactions. The proposed mechanism also achieves budget balance and asymptotic efficiency. Furthermore, these results not only hold for an environment where buyers and sellers exchange identical commodities, but also can be extended to an environment with multiple substitutable commodities.