Fragmented property rights and incentives for R&D

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Clark, Derek J.; Konrad, Kai A.
• 署名单位: UiT The Arctic University of Tromso; Free University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1080.0873
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 969-981
• 关键词: fragmented property rights; patents; contests; hold-up; R&D; inventing around; INNOVATION

摘要

Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms' willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R&D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R&D can be to hold up a rival.