Competitive Incentives: Working Harder or Working Smarter?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bracha, Anat; Fershtman, Chaim
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Boston; Tel Aviv University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Tinbergen Institute
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1597
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 771-781
• 关键词: Behavioral economics; Individual decision making; lab experiment; competitive incentives; Work effort

摘要

Almost all jobs require a combination of cognitive effort and labor effort. This paper focuses on the effect that competitive incentive schemes have on the chosen combination of these two types of efforts. We use an experimental approach to show that competitive incentives may induce agents to work harder but not necessarily smarter. This effect was stronger for women.