Financing Through Asset Sales

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Edmans, Alex; Mann, William
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European Corporate Governance Institute; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2981
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 3043-3060
• 关键词: ASSET SALES; financing; pecking order; synergies; Equity issuance

摘要

Most research on firm financing studies debt versus equity issuance. We model an alternative source, non-core asset sales, and identify three new factors that contrast it with equity. First, unlike asset purchasers, equity investors own a claim to the firm's balance sheet (the balance sheet effect). This includes the cash raised, mitigating information asymmetry. Contrary to the intuition of Myers and Majluf [Myers SC, Majluf NS (1984) Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. J. Financial Econom. 13(2):187-2211, even if non-core assets exhibit less information asymmetry, the firm issues equity if the financing need is high. Second, firms can disguise the sale of low-quality assets-but not equity-as motivated by dissynergies (the camouflage effect). Third, selling equity implies a lemons discount for not only the equity issued but also the rest of the firm, since both are perfectly correlated (the correlation effect). A discount on assets need not reduce the stock price, since non-core assets are not a carbon copy of the firm.