A Reconnaissance Penetration Game With Territorial-Constrained Defender

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Liang, Li; Deng, Fang; Wang, Jianan; Lu, Maobin; Chen, Jie
• 署名单位: Beijing University of Chemical Technology; Tongji University; Beijing Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0018-9286
• DOI: 10.1109/TAC.2022.3183034
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 6295-6302
• 关键词: games; Reconnaissance; differential games; Missiles; Base stations; Velocity measurement; trajectory; barrier; pursuit-evasion differential game; reconnaissance penetration

摘要

A reconnaissance penetration game is a classic target-attacker-defender game. In this game, a reconnaissance UAV (namely attacker) tries to avoid the defender and reconnoiter a target as close as possible, whereas a target tries to escape the attacker with the help of defender. Practically, the defender is considered constrained in a certain territory to capture the attacker and help the target. This article is primarily concerned with the winning region for three players. An explicit policy method is proposed to construct the barrier analytically. In addition, taking practical payoff functions into account, a complete solution to the reconnaissance game is provided by fusing the games of kind and degree. Simulation results are elaborated to showcase the effectiveness of the proposed policy.