Motivating Whistleblowers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Butler, Jeffrey, V; Serra, Danila; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Merced; Southern Methodist University; Stockholm School of Economics; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3240
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 605-621
• 关键词: whistleblowing; FRAUD; rewards; SOCIAL JUDGMENT; experiment

摘要

Law-breaking activities within firms are widespread but difficult to uncover, making whistleblowing by employees desirable. We investigate if and how monetary incentives and expectations of social approval or disapproval from the public, and their interactions, affect an employee's decision to blow the whistle when the social damage from the reported misbehavior is more or less salient. Our analysis also has implications for the design and management of firms' internal whistleblowing channels.