On the Role of Group Size in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from Laboratory and Field Experiments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: List, John A.; Van Soest, Daan; Stoop, Jan; Zhou, Haiwen
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Tilburg University; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Old Dominion University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3441
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 4359-4377
• 关键词: theory of tournaments; experiments; incentives; uncertainty

摘要

We explore how individual equilibrium effort in tournaments varies with the number of contestants. The probability of winning a tournament depends on both effort and luck, and we show that the distribution of the luck component is critical in determining individual equilibrium effort. Our theory predicts that equilibrium effort is an increasing (decreasing) function of the number of contestants if there is considerable (little) mass on favorable draws. We test our theory using both laboratory and field experiments, and find substantial support for our theory in both settings.