Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M.
• 署名单位: University of Bayreuth; University of Munich
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3290
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2194-2212
• 关键词: procurement; RENEGOTIATION; auctions; design flaws; adaptation costs; behavioral contract theory

摘要

A buyer who wants to procure a complex good is often aware that there may be flaws in her initial design, but she does not know what they look like. Potential sellers who discover flaws have no incentive to reveal them early if the buyer uses a price-only auction. We derive an efficient mechanism that induces all sellers to report flaws early and that allocates the project to the seller with the lowest cost. We show that this can be implemented with a simple two-stage auction that does not require any prior knowledge of the set of possible flaws.