Exploration in Teams and the Encouragement Effect: Theory and Experimental Evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: von Essen, Emma; Huysentruyt, Marieke; Miettinen, Topi
• 署名单位: Aarhus University; Stockholm University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Stockholm School of Economics; Hanken School of Economics
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3494
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: economics: behavior and behavioral decision making; economics: game theory and bargaining theory; economics: microeconomic behavior; industrial organization: firm objectives; organization and behavior decision analysis: sequential

摘要

This paper analyzes a two-person, two-stage model of sequential exploration where both information and payoff externalities exist and tests the derived hypotheses in the laboratory. We theoretically show that, even when agents are self-interested and perfectly rational, the information externality induces an encouragement effect: a positive effect of first player exploration on the optimality of the second player exploring as well. When agents have other-regarding preferences and imperfectly optimize, the encouragement effect is strongest. The explorative nature of the game raises the expected surplus compared with a payoff equivalent public goods game. We empirically confirm our main theoretical predictions using a novel experimental paradigm. Our findings are relevant for motivating and managing groups and teams innovating not only for private but also and especially so, for public goods.