Calculative Trust and Interfirm Contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Susarla, Anjana; Holzhacker, Martin; Krishnan, Ranjani
• 署名单位: Michigan State University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3394
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 5465-5484
• 关键词: TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS; Hold up problem; adaptation costs; RELATIONAL CONTRACTS; trust

摘要

Interfirm contracts are plagued by opportunism arising from exchange hazards that increase the seller's gains from holdup in fixed price contracts. These exchange hazards are higher when the seller can engage in unverifiable deliberate obfuscation. Although cost-plus contracts reduce holdup losses, they suffer from cost inefficiency. Past research has underscored the importance of trust as a control instrument to mitigate losses from exchange hazards, especially social relational trust that develops from past experiences. However, trust can also be calculative when it develops from the expectation of future economic gains to the buyer-seller dyad. We identify two dyadic mechanisms that generate calculative trust and curtail the likelihood of cost-inefficient behavior in cost-plus contracts. These mechanisms include future potential and bilateral reputation capital for cost containment. Analysis using probit estimations on 149 information technology outsourcing contracts for the period 1998 to 2005 suggests that calculative trust increases the likelihood of cost-plus contracts. Thus, calculative trust can mitigate inefficiencies in interfirm contracts.