A Balancing Act of Regulating On-Demand Ride Services

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yu, Jiayi Joey; Tang, Christopher S.; Shen, Zuo-Jun Max; Chen, Xiqun Michael
• 署名单位: Tsinghua University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Zhejiang University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3351
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2975-2992
• 关键词: on-demand ride services; public policy; consumer welfare; social welfare

摘要

Regulating on-demand ride-hailing services (e.g., Uber and DiDi) requires a balance of multiple competing objectives: encouraging innovative business models (e.g., DiDi), sustaining traditional industries (e.g., taxi), creating new jobs, and reducing traffic congestion. This study is motivated by a regulatory policy implemented by the Chinese government in 2017 and a similar policy approved by the New York City Council in 2018 that regulate the maximum number of registered Uber/DiDi drivers. We examine the impact of these policies on the welfare of different stakeholders (i.e., consumers, taxi drivers, on-demand ride service company, and independent drivers). By analyzing a two-period dynamic game that involves these stakeholders, we find that, without government intervention, the on-demand ride service platform can drive the traditional taxi industry out of the market under certain conditions. Relative to no regulations and a complete ban policy, a carefully designed regulatory policy can strike a better balance of multiple competing objectives. Finally, if a government can reform the taxi industry by adjusting the taxi fare, then lowering the taxi fare instead of imposing a strict policy toward on-demand ride services can improve the total social welfare.