Redesigning the Market for Volunteers: A Donor Registry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heger, Stephanie A.; Slonim, Robert; Garbarino, Ellen; Wang, Carmen; Waller, Daniel
• 署名单位: University of Sydney; Harvard University; Australian Red Cross Blood Service; University of Technology Sydney
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3371
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 3528-3541
• 关键词: voluntary labor; COORDINATION; market failure; altruism; COMMITMENT; ask avoidance; market design

摘要

This paper addresses volunteer labor markets where the lack of price signals, nonpecuniary motivations to supply labor, and limited fungibility of supply lead to market failure. To address the causes of the market failure, we conduct a field experiment with volunteer whole blood donors where we introduce a market-clearing mechanism (henceforth: the Registry). Our intention-to-treat estimates suggest that subjects invited to the Registry, regardless of joining, are 66% more responsive to critical shortage appeals than control subjects. While the Registry increases supply during a critical shortage episode, it does not increase supply when there is no shortage; thus, the Registry significantly improves coordination between volunteer donors and collection centers, thereby improving market outcomes. We find evidence that the Registry's effectiveness stems from crowding-in volunteers with purely altruistic motives and volunteers with a preference for commitment.