Token-Weighted Crowdsourcing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tsoukalas, Gerry; Falk, Brett Hemenway
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3515
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 3843-3859
• 关键词: blockchain; crowdsourcing; Cryptocurrency; information aggregation; on-chain governance; strategic voting; tokenomics; token-curated registries

摘要

Blockchain-based platforms often rely on token-weighted voting (t-weighting) to efficiently crowdsource information from their users for a wide range of applications, including content curation and on-chain governance. We examine the effectiveness of such decentralized platforms for harnessing the wisdom and effort of the crowd. We find that t-weighting generally discourages truthful voting and erodes the platform's predictive power unless users are strategic enough to unravel the underlying aggregation mechanism. Platform accuracy decreases with the number of truthful users and the dispersion in their token holdings, and in many cases, platforms would be better off with a flat 1/n mechanism. When, prior to voting, strategic users can exert effort to endogenously improve their signals, users with more tokens generally exert more effort-a feature often touted in marketing materials as a core advantage of t-weighting-however, this feature is not attributable to the mechanism itself, and more importantly, the ensuing equilibrium fails to achieve the first-best accuracy of a centralized platform. The optimality gap decreases as the distribution of tokens across users approaches a theoretical optimum, which we derive, but tends to increase with the dispersion in users' token holdings.