Learning Through Crowdfunding

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chemla, Gilles; Tinn, Katrin
• 署名单位: Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; McGill University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3278
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1783-1801
• 关键词: reward-based crowdfunding; moral hazard; Real options; learning; uncertainty

摘要

We develop a model in which reward-based crowdfunding enables firms to obtain a reliable proof of concept early in their production cycle: they learn about total demand from a limited sample of target consumers preordering a new product. Learning from the crowdfunding sample creates a valuable real option because firms invest only if updated expectations about total demand are sufficiently high. This is particularly valuable for firms facing a high degree of uncertainty about consumer preferences, such as developers of innovative consumer products. Learning also enables firms to overcome moral hazard. The higher the funds raised, the lower the firms' incentives to divert them, provided third-party platforms limit the sample size by restricting campaign length. Although the probability of campaign success decreases with sample size, the expected funds raised are maximized at an intermediate sample size. Our results are consistent with stylized facts and lead to new empirical implications.