The Interplay Between Obfuscation and Prominence in Price Comparison Platforms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mamadehussene, Samir
• 署名单位: Universidade Catolica Portuguesa
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3403
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 4843-4862
• 关键词: Pricing; obfuscation; platforms; prominence

摘要

This paper analyzes price comparison platforms' equilibrium design of their search environments, namely the order under which firms are displayed (having a prominent firm or listing firms randomly) and how much price complexity firms are able to use. It is found that (1) the possibility to obfuscate amplifies firms' willingness to pay for the prominent position; (2) when platforms sell prominence, they optimally allow for more obfuscation than they would if they were to display firms randomly; and (3) if platforms are sufficiently differentiated, they find it optimal to sell prominence. Thus, platforms exploit their market power over consumers by implementing a prominent position and allowing for large levels of obfuscation. This paper also finds that in equilibrium, there is tension between platforms and firms regarding how much price complexity is used: firms would like to use even more obfuscation than what the platform allows, so the platform must monitor firms' prices to make sure that they are not excessively complex.