Steering in Online Markets: The Role of Platform Incentives and Credibility

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barach, Moshe A.; Golden, Joseph M.; Horton, John J.
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3412
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 4047-4070
• 关键词: information systems; IT policy and management; economics of IS; ECONOMICS; microeconomic behavior; systems analysis and design

摘要

Platform marketplaces can potentially steer buyers to certain sellers by recommending or guaranteeing those sellers. Money-back guarantees-which create a direct financial stake for the platform in seller performance-might be particularly effective at steering as they align buyer and platform interests in creating a good match. We report the results of an experiment in which a platform marketplace-an online labor market-guaranteed select sellers for treated buyers. The presence of a guarantee strongly steered buyers to these guaranteed sellers, but offering guarantees did not increase sales overall, suggesting financial risk was not determinative for the marginal buyer. This preference for guaranteed sellers was not the result of their lower financial risk, but rather because buyers viewed the platform's decision to guarantee as informative about relative seller quality. Indeed, a follow-up experiment showed that simply recommending the sellers that the platform would have guaranteed was equally effective at steering buyers.