Persuasion Through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hoffmann, Florian; Inderst, Roman; Ottaviani, Marco
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Goethe University Frankfurt; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3455
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 4958-4979
• 关键词: selective disclosure; hypertargeting; limited attention; privacy regulation

摘要

This paper models how firms or political campaigners (senders) persuade consumers and voters (receivers) by selectively disclosing information about their offering depending on individual receivers' preferences and orientations. We derive positive and normative implications depending on the extent of competition among senders, whether receivers are wary of senders collecting personalized data, and whether firms are able to personalize prices. We show how both senders and receivers can benefit from selective disclosure. Privacy laws requiring senders to obtain consent to acquire personal information that enables such selective disclosure increases receiver welfare if and only if there is little or asymmetric competition among senders, if receivers are unwary, and if firms can price discriminate.