Pay, Pat, and Clawback: Incentivizing Service Providers' Participation in On-Demand Digital Platforms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yaraghi, Niam; Ramesh, Ramaswamy; Tayi, Giri Kumar
• 署名单位: University of Miami; Brookings Institution; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.02603
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: micro randomized trials; monetary incentives; nonmonetary incentives; loss-aversion framework; Incentive design; on-demand digital platforms

摘要

A critical governance challenge for on-demand digital platforms is to increase the participation of their service providers. In this research, we design novel incentive structures by taking the unique features of on-demand digital platforms into account. In 12 micro randomized trials conducted in partnership with a major on-demand digital platform, we examine how combining monetary with nonmonetary incentives and providing them within a loss-aversion framework could motivate service providers to increase their participation levels. We show that in on-demand platforms the nonmonetary incentives inhibit the impact of monetary incentives on service provider participation once they are offered together. Furthermore, in contrast to traditional work settings, offering incentives within a loss-aversion framework only increases the effectiveness of nonmonetary incentives. We provide theoretical explanations and empirical examinations for these counterintuitive results. The insights from this research could be used by on-demand digital platforms to effectively mobilize and sustain their service providers' participation to meet real-time stochastic demand.