Supply function equilibrium in a constrained transmission system
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Wilson, Robert
署名单位：
Stanford University
刊物名称：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0030-364X
DOI：
10.1287/opre.1070.0421
发表日期：
2008
页码：
369-382
关键词：
摘要：
This paper characterizes a supply function equilibrium in an auction market constrained by limited capacities of links in a transportation network and limited input/output capacities of participants. The formulation is adapted to a wholesale spot market for electricity managed by the operator of the transmission system. The results are derived using the calculus of variations to obtain the Euler conditions and the transversality conditions that characterize a Nash equilibrium in an auction in which bids are as supply functions, and quantities and payments are based either on nodal prices or pay-as-bid.