Contracting under vendor managed inventory systems using holding cost subsidies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nagarajan, Mahesh; Rajagopalan, S.
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1059-1478
• DOI: 10.3401/poms.1080.0011
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 200-210
• 关键词: vendor managed inventory; COORDINATION; CONTRACTING; multiperiod model; holding cost subsidy

摘要

Vendor managed inventory systems are becoming increasingly popular. An important issue in implementing a vendor managed inventory scheme is the contracting terms that dictate the ownership of the inventory and the responsibility of inventory replenishment decisions. Thus the performance of a vendor managed system crucially depends on these terms and on how inventory-related costs are shared in a supply chain. We consider a system where a manufacturer supplies a single product to a retailer who faces random demand in a competitive market. The retailer incurs a fixed cost per order, inventory holding cost, and a penalty cost for a stockout (unsatisfied demand is back-ordered). Further, the manufacturer incurs a penalty cost when there is a stockout at the retailer and a fixed replenishment cost. We assume that the players are rational and act noncooperatively. We compare the performance of retailer managed inventory systems, where the retailer places orders and makes replenishment decisions, with vendor managed inventory systems, wherein the vendor or manufacturer makes inventory and replenishment decisions. Specifically, in the vendor managed inventory system, we propose and evaluate holding cost subsidy-type contracts on inventories offered by the retailer to improve system performance. We evaluate this contract in the context of three widely used inventory systems-deterministic economic order quantity, continuous review (Q, r) policies, and periodic review policies-and show when such contracts may improve channel performance.